Uri Avnery's Column 

The Command / Uri Avnery


You can't understand Ehud Barak without knowing where he came from: the "General Staff commando unit".

The commando unit is not an army unit like any other. It is a frame of mind, a disposition, a way of looking at the world.

During the 1948 war I served in Samson's Foxes company which was, together with the Negev Animals, the mother of all Israeli army commando units. I know what I am talking about, because at the time I became infected with some of these traits myself. It wasn't easy to get rid of them.

The commando is a "select" unit and its members are very aware of this. In order to prepare them for especially dangerous missions, they are instilled with the belief that they are the best, the most courageous; each one special. They are imbued with contempt for all other soldiers. "It's us and nobody else."

This feeling of superiority brings with it a contempt for law and order. A commando will not be caught properly dressed, he will always take care to look a bit disheveled. Rules which apply to ordinary soldiers - the chain of command, outward (as distinct from "inner") discipline, parade-ground drill and other such "bullshit" - are not for him. The word bullshit is used in its original version, as is the word "bardak", meaning bordello - a general state of blessed disorder.

Daring, initiative and resourcefulness are essential commando attributes, as is the other side of the coin - arrogance and smugness.

More important than these personal traits are the operational ones. The commando exists for special operations, often behind enemy lines. Therefore, the commando operates in small units able to move quickly, to surprise the enemy from an unexpected direction, to achieve the objective and get out. The commando is not designed to hold on to a conquered position, but rather to clear out quickly, before the opponent has time to counterattack. To kill, to confirm the killing, to scram.

The term "commando", in this sense, is derived from the Dutch. It originated at the time of the Boer Wars (Boer is Dutch for farmer) when the regular British army fought against the Dutch settlers in South Africa, who formed small local militias and called them "commandos". These were extremely mobile units, they knew the countryside well and were able to surprise the cumbersome British battalions.

The British learned their lesson and in World War II they set up their own commandos. Jews from Palestine (my brother among them fought in one of them, the Middle East Commando. The commandos were employed in hit-and-run operations, which were not uniformly successful.

The way of thinking of a commando chief (like Ariel Sharon, chief of Unit 101) is quite different from that of a general commanding a mass of armor and infantry (like Israel Tal, the tank expert). The general has to move large forces, coordinate between commanders with huge egos, safeguard occupied territory, plan supplies and keep allies in line. His perceptions of space, time and forces are quite alien to a commando chief. A commando, on the other hand, has no strategic perception, he deals only with short-term tactics. Barak, for example. put on women's clothes, landed in Beirut, killed Palestinian leaders and got out. On another occasion, he donned white overalls, entered the Sabena airplane (at Tel Aviv airport), killed the kidnappers. Finis.

Therefore, it is nearly impossible for a commando officer to become the chief-of-staff in a normal army. But in Israel, the opposite is true: Nearly all recent chiefs-of-staff have come from the commandos. In the political arena, the situation is even stranger: In no other Western democracy are there so many generals in the Government and in other senior positions. In Israel, the last two Prime Ministers were former commando officers.

Barak conducts a commando policy. On the positive side, he has a lot of daring, originality and resourcefulness. On the negative side, he has a lot of arrogance and pomposity that tells him that he knows everything better than anybody else, an abysmal contempt for his colleagues and an inability to set up an orderly administration, to coordinate between colleagues and to delegate responsibility. All these are typical commando traits.

He conducts a hit-and-run policy: negotiations with the Syrians approach the last stage and then - sudden disengagement and quick retreat; negotiations with the Palestinians approach the final stage - and the same all over again. The same is going to happen to the "civil" and/or "secular" and/or "social" revolution. Everything is tactics; nothing is strategy. All are daring hit-and-run raids, none of them well-planned actions designed to achieve an objective and hold on to it.

"Use tricks in making war," says the Book of Proverbs (in its original Hebrew version). It does not advise using tricks to make peace.