Uri Avnery's Column 

The Coming War / Uri Avnery


Concerning the Duvdevan affair, all the questions have already been asked, except the important ones.

(Duvdevan, Hebrew for cherry, is the code-name of an undercover Israeli army unit used in Palestinian surroundings, usually masquerading as Arabs. In a recent action, three of its soldiers were accidentally killed by their own comrades in the Palestinian village Assira al-Shmalieh while trying to capture and/or kill a "wanted" Hamas fighter, Mahmoud Abu-Hunud. He escaped. In another action, a 72 years old Palestinian, who mistook the Israeli soldiers for thieves and opened fire, was also killed.)

The important questions are:

  1. What would have happened if the Assira action had succeeded?
  2. Why did Ehud Barak approve this action and the one before, in which an old Palestinian was killed?
  3. Why was this unit not disbanded long ago?

The answer to the first question is frightening. When Mossad agents failed to kill the Hamas leader in the bungled action in Amman, it was the failure which saved us from catastrophe, the very catastrophe which befell us when the Security Service succeeded in killing the Hamas fighter Yikhye Ayash, nicknamed "the engineer".

That so-called "success" buried Shim'on Peres, the then Prime Minister. In a series of revenge actions, dozens of Israelis were killed, Benjamin Netanyahu was swept into power and peace was postponed.

If Abu-Hunud, had been killed, the same thing would have happened: A series of terrorist actions, dozens killed, the return of the Likud to power, the end of Barak's career.

For a year and a half we have had quiet. It is not the Cherries who have achieved this, but Yasser Arafat. He has succeeded because the majority of Palestinians realize that terrorist acts at this time will damage their cause. Palestinian public opinion prevents Hamas actions. But if Abu-Hunud had been killed, he would have become a folk hero and the Palestinians would have cried out for revenge.

However, the action failed. Abu-Hunud escaped and turned himself in to the Palestinian police. Everybody is satisfied. So why did Barak not let the Palestinians arrest him in the first place?

The answer to the other two questions is even more disturbing. Barak talks about peace. According to him, we could have peace tomorrow morning, if only Arafat was more forthcoming. The invasion of a village under (civilian) Palestinian rule by an Israeli army unit will most certainly not push Arafat in this direction. On the contrary, there will be more public pressure on him not to give in to Barak's demands.

There must be some method in this madness. After all, Barak is a logical person.

There is indeed a logical explanation for the continued existence of units like Duvdevan and the extension of their activity, some (if not all) of which are training exercises - a frightening explanation. These are preparations for the forthcoming big military confrontation that is bound to occur if the peace process finally breaks down. It is quite possible that the four victims of the Duvdevan actions - the old Palestinian and the three soldiers - will in future be considered the first victims of the next Israeli-Palestinian war.

What will this war be like?

Let's look at a possible scenario:

The Palestinians will declare their state on the West Bank and in the Gaza trip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

In retaliation, Israel will declare the annexation of the settlements.

Crowds of unarmed Palestinians will march on some of the isolated settlements.

The Israeli army will send in large reinforcements, in addition to the tanks already stationed there.

Somebody (probably a settler) will open fire.

All over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, fights will break out between the Israeli army and the 40 thousand Palestinian soldiers, who will be joined by a 100 thousand armed Fatah youth and all the other Palestinian organizations. Hundreds of Palestinians and dozens of Israelis will be killed.

As some Israeli generals have already speculated in public, attack helicopters will be sent into action.

At this stage, Barak will have to decide whether to send the army into the Palestinian towns.

If he does, there will be street-battles, in which the tanks will be met by Hamas suicide bombers and Fatah fighters, who might succeed in destroying some of them. (In 1976, a Syrian tank column, which entered Sidon in order to destroy the PLO forces there, was nearly annihilated.)

Casualties (mostly Palestinians) will probably be numbered in thousands.

Perhaps Barak will not involve the army in fighting of this kind. Instead, he might decide to blockade the Palestinian towns and villages, hoping to beat them into submission through starvation.

Palestinians will try to break out by force. Again, there will be hundreds of casualties.

The Palestinians, fighting for their national existence, will be willing to absorb many casualties. How many casualties will the Israeli public be ready to sustain in such a war? When the UN finally intervenes and declares a cease-fire, the Israeli public will be glad to accept it.

What next?

Both sides will return to where they are now, both will be wiser. Our side, too. We shall then make the concessions necessary for peace, which Barak is not ready to make today.

Only, the dead will not be there to see.