What kind of logic leads soldiers into a trap? It happened once before. They called it the "Bar-Lev Line." Almost by chance, without any prior strategic planning or any official decision, a line of fortifications was established along the Suez Canal. Israel Tal, Ariel Sharon, Matityahu Peled, and yours truly, had decried this folly, to no avail. Hundreds of soldiers paid for it with their lives.

Now the same pattern continues in Lebanon. The price tag for this folly is growing. Like the Bar-Lev Line, this one also began without any particular forethought. During Rabin's first government, Defense Minister Shimon Peres picked a Christian-Lebanese army Major, one Sa'ad Haddad, and gave him an "enclave" on Lebanese soil, so that he would defend our northern border. It seemed like a brilliant move. A bit of methodical thinking would have demonstrated that it was bound to lead to disaster.

Note: Once the Lebanese border was Israel's quietest border, virtually a border of peace. In the mid forties I once hiked alone from Kfar Gil'adi to Misgav-Am, suddenly finding myself on an unfamiliar road. A polite Lebanese gendarme approached me and showed me the way back to Palestine (as it was at the time).

All this obviously changed when the PLO organizations were expelled from Jordan during Black September (1970), and got a foothold in Southern Lebanon. The border became the scene of fierce guerilla fighting, but the Lebanese population was not involved. In fact, this population strenuously objected to the presence of the Palestinians. This was amply demonstrated when this population -- of Shi'ites, yet! -- welcomed the IDF with hoots of joy and handfuls of rice at the onset of the war with Lebanon. The Shi'ites believed that the IDF would get rid of the Palestinians and then go back home.

But the IDF did not go back home. After a few months, a new kind of guerilla war began. Those submissive Shi'ites, who for centuries had been downtrodden, suddenly turned into fierce lions, fighting the Israeli invader. Much blood was shed before our military and political leadership decided in 1984 to "put their tail between their legs" (yes, Mr. Netanyahu, this is the right expression) and get out.

But not altogether. Shimon Peres, the head of the unity government at the time, was reminded of Major Haddad, and decided to repeat the move on a large scale. Once again there was a "Security Zone." And so began the unavoidable dance macabre. The Shi'ites stood up to defend their homeland. The Syrians and the Iranians discovered that this state of affairs was actually dove-tailing with their own goals, and began providing help. South Lebanon had become Israel's Vietnam.

There is no way in the world to win a guerilla war, whose fighters view it as a war of liberation against a foreign occupier and its local collaborators. The only way is to disengage and get out. The sooner the better.

There are those who say: it won't work without Syria. But Syria is using the Hizbollah to pressure Israel to return the Golan Heights. We could gain Syria's support only if we decided to give back the entire Golan. If Netanyahu and his partners are prepared to pay this price -- fine. If not, they should stop this nonsense about Syrian consent. It just won't happen.

There are those who say: But we need a Lebanese partner. This, too, is nonsense. Lebanon is now practically part of Syria, as it has been throughout most of its history. Without Syrian consent, there will be no Lebanese consent.

There are those who say: If we get out of Lebanon, the guerillas will follow us and will endanger Israeli territory. There is no evidence to support such a claim. The Hizbollah is not a Syrian agent. It is a Lebanese party, and its goal is to turn Lebanon into an Islamic republic, patterned after Iran. It has no interest to act within Israel.

But, for the sake of argument, and in the face of all logic -- let us assume for a moment that the Hizbollah movement, under Iranian and Syrian pressure, will try, after all, to continue fighting us. With such a scenario, the situation would still be much better for Israel. In order to conduct such warfare, they would need the support of the local population. This population is now supporting a war against a foreign invader. It would not support a war across its borders, which could, in fact, endanger it. In other words: The Hizbollah would be considerably weakened, and its activity against Israel would be rendered negligible. It would be a whole lot cheaper to fight the Hizbollah from within our own territory.

Logic dictates: Get out, and promptly. Every brave officer must stand up and say this out loud. But brave officers are not exactly an easy-to-find commodity. The garden-variety officer knows that his career depends on politicians. Why should he antagonize them? And why should the garden-variety politician, for instance, Yitzhak Mordechai, say something which would be objectionable to his party's leader?

Evidently, only the soldiers' mothers, who are ready to demonstrate the necessary courage and determination, can force the leadership to cease and desist from this lethal folly.